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Disimagination and Sentiment 
in Nishitani’s Religious Aesthetics
This paper discusses the notion of disimagination—a translation of the 
German word Entbildung, which was devised by Meister Eckhart as a rein-
terpretation of the Neoplatonic categories of abstraction (aphairesis) and 
negation (apophasis)—in connection with Nishitani Keiji’s “standpoint of 
emptiness” (空の立場). Nishitani proposes a nonsubjective, nonrepresen-
tational, and nonconceptual type of knowledge to avoid the problem of 
representation implied in the modern subjective self-consciousness that 
prevents our access to the reality of things. It is argued that what he calls a 
“knowing of non-knowing” (無知の知) can be understood as a transposi-
tion of the problematics of aphairesis to a new context, that of the “formless 
form” (無相の相). The ontology of images in the creative process, both cos-
mic and artistic, is examined from Nishitani’s identification of likeness and 
suchness on the field of emptiness. It is suggested that the resulting denial 
of the traditional distinction between being and appearance approaches a 
critique closer to postfoundational metaphysics and, like disimagination, 
aims at an ascetic movement of self-negation and detachment from words 







Art… plays an unwitting game with things. As a 
child imitates us in his play, we imitate in [our] play 
the forces which created the world and are [still] creat-
ing it.
—Paul Klee
I would like to start with a remembrance of Ueda Shizuteru who recently passed away. In 2006, Ueda took part in the biannual Haas Lectures 
in Barcelona. On that occasion, the Chilean artist Fernando Prats pre-
sented an exhibition entitled “Basho, the savage region,” in allusion both 
to the central concept in Nishida’s philosophy, “basho 場所” or “place,” 
and to what Merleau-Ponty calls “région sauvage,” the “untamed,” or “sav-
age region” of the self, that is, a realm of experience not yet embraced by 
our culture and not yet interpreted by our culturally determined language. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, we are able to communicate with other cul-
tures through this savage region, which is at our disposal as “a new organ of 
understanding” unincorporated in our own culture.1 In fact, Ueda intro-
duced this expression in one of his writings to suggest that Nishida’s notion 
of “pure experience” resembles that wild region that can only be reached by 
breaking through the hardened shells of our own cultural forms.2 The Haas 
Lectures for that year were devoted to Eastern and Western mysticism, and 
the artist Fernando Prats attempted to evoke this kind of place as a locus of 
mutual encounter and understanding.
The essential elements of Prats’s work at the time were inspired by a 
visit he had paid to the Department of Geology at the University of Chile. 
1. Merleau-Ponty 1977, 120.
2. Ueda 1994, 36.
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There he was able to see the soot-covered pages of the seismogram record-
ing the 1960 Valdivia earthquake in Chile that measured 9.6 on the Richter 
scale. Prats’s artistic reproduction was prepared in advance of the lectures. 
A fine layer of ashen soot was spread over large pieces of paper and verti-
cal illumination was placed around it to express the internal movement 
of the earth.3 To everyone’s surprise, during the presentation of the piece, 
Ueda knelt down and drew in the soot with his fingers near one corner of 
the installation. Then he removed his shoes and took a few steps towards 
the center. There he joined his hands, bowed, turned, and returned outside. 
He had drawn a circle, a triangle, and a square (see figures 1–4 on pages 
48–49).
Sengai’s universe
The circle-triangle-square is Sengai’s depiction of the uni-
verse (figure 5). Sengai Gibon 仙厓義梵 (1750–1837) was the abbot of 
Shōfuku-ji, the first Zen institution established in Japan in 1195, as the signa-
ture on the calligraphy shows. The paintings of this Zen monk and artist are 
known for their simplicity and sense of humour. Shortly before his death, 
3. Cf. Fernando Prats, Eclíptica [Exp. Galeria Joan Prats-Artgràfic, Barcelona, 21.10–
30.11/2008] (Barcelona : Galeria Joan Prats, 2008).
figure 5. Sengai’s Universe.
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Daisetz Suzuki wrote a book on Sengai in which he interpreted Sengai’s uni-
verse as follows: 
The circle represents the infinite, and the infinite is at the basis of all beings. 
But the infinite in itself is formless. We humans endowed with senses and 
figure 2. Ueda Shizuteru’s intervention in Fernando Prats’s work.  
Photo courtesy of Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
figure 1. Fernando Prats, “Basho, la regió salvatge.” Photo courtesy of Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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intellect demand tangible forms. Hence a triangle. The triangle is the begin-
ning of all forms [we could say, the individual]. Out of it first comes the 
square. A square is the triangle doubled. This doubling process goes on infi-
nitely and we have the multitudinosity of things, which the Chinese philoso-
pher calls “the ten thousand things,” that is, the universe.… 
figure 3. Ueda’s intervention in Prats’s work. Photo courtesy of Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
figure 4. Ueda’s intervention in Prats’s work. Photo courtesty of Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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A circle turns into a triangle, and then into a square, and finally into infi-
nitely varied and varying figures.4 
With a few strokes of the brush, the artist captured a kind of cosmic har-
mony and, at the same time, replicated the spirit of the universe through 
his own creative act. The three figures are not separate but interconnected 
through a few agile strokes in which the circle and the triangle intersect 
forming a small empty space, and the triangle touches and enters the square. 
The thickness of the strokes gradually decreases, leaving blank spaces in the 
outline of the square, which is not hermetically closed but remains half-
opened. Blank spaces dominate the surface of the canvas—not as mere back-
ground but as that to which the forms give expression. As the philosopher 
Giangiorgio Pasqualotto notes, the forms and their symbolic meaning are 
found widely in Hindu and Buddhist yantra and mandala, where the square 
symbolizes the earth in its unformed materiality; the triangle, the mani-
festation of reality prior to all forms; and the circle, the original unity that 
embraces all forms.5
Suzuki also relates the three figures to Shingon and Zen, both Buddhist 
traditions familiar to Sengai: 
He liked Shingon because it taught the identity of the bodily existence 
(rūpakāya) with ultimate reality (dharmakāya). The bodily existence is here 
represented by a triangle which symbolizes the human body in its triple 
aspect, physical, oral (or intellectual), and mental (or spiritual). The quad-
rangle represents the objective world which is composed of the four great ele-
ments (mahābhūta), earth, water, fire and air. The Dharmakāya, the ultimate 
reality, is the circle here, that is, the formless form.…
We generally hold a dichotomous view of existence, form (rūpa) and form-
less (arūpa), object and subject, matter and spirit, and think they contradict 
each other and are mutually exclusive. Both Shingon and Zen, however, 
oppose this view and hold that what is form is formless or empty (śūnya), 
that is, they are identical. 6
According to the classic Buddhist cosmology found in Abhidharma lit-
erature, the universe is made up of mountain chains, oceans, and continents 
4. Suzuki 1971, 36–7.
5. Pasqualotto 2007, 196.
6. Suzuki 1971, 37.
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inhabited by sentient beings and divided into six realms. Mount Meru lies 
at its center, an axial mountain with multiple levels. Although Buddhist art 
was aniconic in its origins,7 it soon developed its own artistic and icono-
graphic forms, including the universe and its three regions: the sensual 
domain of desire or kamadhātu, the pure form domain or rūpadhātu, and 
the formless domain or arūpadhātu.8 
The doctrine of a Dharmakāya (absolute reality) that embraces all phe-
nomena is also central to Huayan (in Japan, Kegon) Buddhism. This Chinese 
school follows the Avataṃsaka sūtra in teaching that deluded people fail to 
see absolute reality, or emptiness, because they see each phenomenon as indi-
vidual and independent. Actually, each phenomenon interpenetrates every 
other without obstruction and thus contains all other phenomena within 
itself. (This is often associated with the image of Indra’s net, but it is also sug-
gested in Huayan mural paintings like those found in the Dunhuang caves 
that were meant to serve visual and ritual practice.) As Suzuki remarked 
apropos of Shingon and Zen, it is from the perspective of the awakened that 
emptiness and the phenomenal world of forms can be seen as a single reality. 
We recall that the Gandavyūha, the concluding section of the Avatamsaka 
sūtra, together with other Buddhist texts like the Lalitavistara sūtra and the 
Jataka tales, seems to have served as a basis for images found in the reliefs of 
the Borobudur Temple in Java, Indonesia (figures 6 and 7).9 
Illustrating the bodhisattva’s path, although not exactly the three regions 
7. Cf. Karlsson 2000. 
8. “Indian cosmology divides the Cosmos into Three Spheres. The Sphere of Desire encom-
passes all lower realms or states of rebirth (humans, animals, hungry ghosts, the pretas, the in-
mates of the various hells and, and—according to some traditions—the Asuras). In addition 
the Kāmadhātu includes a cluster of Six Heavens: the Caturmahārājika, the Trāyastrimśa, the 
Yāma, the Tusita, the Nirmānarati and the Parinirmitavaśavartin Heaven. The first two of 
these heavens are still on terra firma. The Caturmahārājika, the realm of the Four Guardian 
Kings, is thought to be located on the upper slopes of Mount Sumeru. The summit of Mount 
Sumeru is in Trāyastrimśa Heaven, where the palace of Śakra, or Indra, is located. The other 
four Kāmadhātu heavens are located high above the summit and reach to the Four Heavens 
of the Sphere of Form (Rūpadhātu) above. By definition the Four Heavens of the Arūpadhātu, 
or the Sphere of Formlessness, cannot be assigned a specific physical location (Nattier 2008, 
115), but are regarded as lying beyond the heavens of the Rūpadhātu. The number, names, and 
sequential order of most of these heavens, especially those of the Kāmadhātu, are largely the 
same in most Indian texts and have barely changed in the course of time” (Fontein 1989, 215).
9. Fontein 1989, 210.
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of the universe as is widely assumed,10 the structure represents a guide for 
the spiritual journey of pilgrims. The panels featuring the texts chosen for 
illustration were laid out in a carefully designed sequence in order to create 
a continuous narrative of gradual progress in spiritual development and an 
increasing detachment from earthly bonds.11
At this point, we may pause to summarize the main points thus far. 
First, in Sengai’s painting, the aim is not to portray the form of things 
in the world but their appearance out of the formless world. The universe 
is depicted in a stylized and abstract form in an attempt to reduce the cos-
mic process to its essence. Its continuous movement is evoked through the 
10. According to Jan Fontein, Willem Frederik Stutterheim (1929) borrowed the language of 
Indian cosmology in assigning the hidden base of Borobudur with its Karmavibhanga reliefs 
to the Sphere of Desire (Kāmadhātu), the galleries to the Sphere of Form (Rūpadhātu), and 
the circular terraces to the Sphere of Formlessness (Arūpadhātu). His interpretation was later 
called into question, but in the course of time acquired the status of established fact and found 
its way into many Borobudur studies (Fontein 1989, 214–15). 
11. Fontein 1989, 212. The contrast between the exuberant imagery of the galleries and the 
simplicity of the near-circular terraces with their latticed stūpas seems to correspond with a 
contrast between the mundane and supramundane: on the one hand, the visitor’s mind em-
bedded in the phenomenal world, and on the other, the freedom of detachment from worldly 
thoughts, “a sense of increasing sanctity that is created by the architecture and its decoration—
or lack thereof ” (Fontein 1989, 218).
figure 6. Borobudur Temple, Java, Indonesia.
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resolute and dynamic gestures of the artist’s brush strokes. This is a fine 
example of the artistic creative process as a mirroring of the cosmic process. 
Second, Suzuki’s interpretation introduces two central concepts, form 
and formless form, which are important both in traditional Buddhist 
thought and for modern academic Japanese philosophers like Nishida 
Kitarō, Nishitani Keiji, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, and Ueda Shizuteru. 
Third, the Borobudur Temple demonstrates the aesthetic potential of 
Buddhist art in the double sense of ascetic and sensory apprehension. Of 
course, one cannot speak of “aesthetics” here in the sense in which the term 
is related to attempts to identify the conditions for the possibility of value-
judgements about works of art or theories of beauty. The Western origin of 
the term, as it is well known, was coined by the German philosopher Alex-
ander Gottlieb Baumgarten in the eighteenth century, and developed as a 
discipline by Kant in his Critique of the Power of Judgement. Here, we are 
understanding aesthetics not only in reference to artistic experience but also 
to reflection about sensation and perception. Moreover, inasmuch as we are 
concerned with beauty manifesting itself without any dichotomy of subject 
and object,12 aesthetics also entails the Greek sense of askesis as discipline, in 
this case, directed to detachment from the self.
12. Here neither the work can be attributed to any subject nor being judged subjectively by 
figure 7. Borobudur Temple plant shaped like a mandala.
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On this basis, I would like to take up the philosophical problem that 
Nishitani Keiji calls “the paradox of representation.” I will address the pro-
cess of “decreation”—or with regard to images, of “disimagination”—as a 
part of the creative process and a way of dealing with, and perhaps solving, 
Nishitani’s paradox. In so doing, I propose to reflect on certain elements in 
Japanese art that reflect the limitations of images and words to represent 
reality—images and words understood here as limited forms of expres-
sion—and at the same time develop interesting strategies for expressing real-
ity not by representing it but by actualizing it.
The problem of appearances: what is real?
Until this day, the intellectual history of the West 
is torn between iconism and iconoclasm.
—Jan Assmann
Creation out of nothing
To introduce the notion of Entbildung or disimagination, I would like to 
take an example from the Christian Neoplatonic world of the creative pro-
cess from formless form to form and then contrast it with Sengai’s picture 
of the universe. John Scotus Erigena’s Periphyseon or De divisione natu-
rae was the inspiration behind the illustration shown on the facing page 
(figure 8).13 Scotus, a ninth century Irish philosopher who translated 
Pseudo-Dionysius from Greek into Latin, proposed that nature consists of 
all things that are and all things that are not. He divided the former into 
four groups14: 
1.  Creating and not created (creans et non creatum): God as the source 
of all. Since God is unknowable and anything predicated of God is 
best expressed in negative rather than positive statements. This is the 
basis of a negative or apophatic theology that refuses any image of the 
divine nature.
2.  Created and creating (creatum et creans): the primordial causes of 
any subject (Pasqualotto 2001, 10).
13. The image belongs to the illustrated manuscript Clavis Physicae by Honorius Augustodu-
nensis, “Honorius of Autun,” which is entirely based on Scotus Erigena’s work.
14. Here I follow the analysis of Francis A. Yates (Yates 1960, 4–12).
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those things in the universe that, as theophanies, are eternal. They 
include Bonitas, Essentia, Vita, Sapientia, and Ratio. They are all divine 
names and correspond to what the Greek referred to as ideas. Taken 
together, they constitute the Divine Word, the Logos, the instrument 
of God’s creative power.
3.  Created and not creating (creatum et non creans): the created universe 
or all that is known in generation, space, and time. From these ele-
ments derive the elemental qualities through whose interrelations the 
whole order of creation is built up, from the highest to the lowest.
4.  Not creating and not created (nec creans nec creatum): God as the 
end of all. As the whole of creation emerged from primordial causes, 
so, too, will it return to them. When the second person of the Trin-
figure 8. Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae.  
Paris: Bibliothèque National, lat. 6.732, s. xii.
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ity redeemed humankind, the whole of creation was also redeemed 
through him so that the whole of creation might rise back to its pri-
mal dignity in the primordial causes, to their final end, which is God. 
The Word is thus both the principium and the finis of all, the alpha 
and the omega, the beginning and the end. By depicting the divine 
Word as the end, Yates suggests, human beings were shown to be the 
image of the divine Trinity, and humanity, restored to the “dignity” 
of the divine image, was seen, in soul and body, to be the nexus of all 
creation.
The expansion of the One into the All, and its retraction back into the 
One—i.e., the exitus et reditus—is the theme of Scotus’ work. The process 
of forming images as imagines Dei lies somewhere between the formless ori-
gin and the formless end out of which creation takes place. God is manifest 
through the visible and creation is therefore an image of the divine being. 
The account in Genesis may thus be seen as a display in images of what was 
previously without image in order that human beings might find their own 
true image. 
This illustration in Figure 8 synthesizes the Platonic hierarchy of being as 
a continuity and the so-called “iconic turn” of Christianity away from the 
biblical prohibition against images of God. Meister Eckhart takes the next 
step with what he calls Entbildung, the imagination’s detachment of the soul 
from representation, freeing it to ascend to the presence of God.15
Entbildung
As Wackernagel’s research has shown, the terms Bildung amd Entbildung 
represent one of the most characteristic creations of Eckhart’s philosophi-
cal language about the image.16 Taken literally, Entbildung means the dis-
15. Wunenburger 1997, 166.
16. See Wackernagel 1991 and 1993. According to Wackernagel “both verbs, bilden and 
entbilden, in spite of the enormous gulf separating their historical development, should be 
taken up together, since they are the original and conjoined creation of Master Eckhart” (1993, 
79). Bildung (formation, education) and the related Einbildung (imagination) are guiding 
concepts of humanism, while Entbildung is almost completely absent in later developments of 
German philosophical and theological vocabulary as well as from contemporary usage, except 
among Eckhart’s disciples, Suso and Tauler, and later, Angelus Silesius.
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secting or or dispossession of an image, its de-representation, or, simply, its 
disimagination.17 
Wackernagel argues that for Eckhart, the notion of image (bilde) includes 
three semantic levels that serve to define the relations between the divine 
being and the created being, ranging from the most sacred to the most 
profane: (1) the concept of the Word-image (the Logos, which is the most 
important element in Trinitarian speculation); (2) the presence of the cre-
ated person (the human being created in “the image” of the creator); and 
(3) the impressions of the inner life and the dissimilar images that have to do 
with perception and constitute the outer world.
Bilden is grounded on a positive evaluation of the image and Bildung is 
understood as paideia—that is, as the “formation” of what is “similar to the 
divine,” the supreme example of which is the human being. Entbilden, in 
contrast, results from a negative evaluation of the image, since it designates 
a dispossession of what is “non-divine” and “dissimilar” in the human being. 
Wackernagel suggests that they are two different points of view on one and 
the same process, and that this Eckhartian doctrine reproduced the antin-
omy already present in the Neoplatonic categories of abstraction (aphaire-
sis) and negation (apophasis). 
Even if Entbildung may be said to derive from the Plotinian aphairesis, 
the term is less a translation than a transposition of the problematic to a new 
context, that of the image and “form.”18 Consider, for example, the famous 
passage in the sixth treatise on “Beauty” in Plotinus’ Enneads (i 6.9):
But how are you to see into a virtuous Soul and know its loveliness? 
Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beauti-
ful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts 
away here, he smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, 
until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also cut away all that 
is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, 
17. For Wackernagel, disillusion, disalienation, iconoclasm, and decontruction are not ap-
propriate translations, since these terms do not include the full constellation of meanings in 
Entbildung. In particular, they lack the noetic, ethical, and meditative dimensions of the Eck-
hartian sense of the word. 
18. And this happens “through the mediation of the term ablatio and its Latin synonyms” 
(De Libera 2014, 2). 
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labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, 
until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendor of virtue.19
Compare these words with the following passage from Eckhart:
When a master creates an image out of wood or stone, he does not insert the 
image into the material; rather he removes the shavings (in the case of wood) 
that had hidden and covered the image. He adds nothing to the wood; on 
the contrary, he strips away and extracts what covers the image, he removes 
the dross; what shines through is what was hidden beneath it.20
As with Plotinus, Eckhart takes abstraction and negation to indicate 
both a way of language and a way of life.21 According to De Libera, Eckhart 
employs the term Entbildung to denote the stripping away of all images, the 
baring of the soul through “negative” askesis, and the passage through images 
and mental copies.22 In this sense, it bears comparison with the prohibition 
against images in the Decalogue “You shall not make for yourself an image 
in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the 
waters below” (Exodus, 20: 4).
The biblical injunction is as political as it is theological, as Jan Assmann 
has demonstrated.23 On the one hand, it can be interpreted as a political 
question of loyalty in the sense that the prohibition of other gods is meant 
to enjoin people to spare themselves from worldly pitfalls by abstaining 
19. Plotinus 1992, 63. 
20. Meister Eckhart, dw 5: 113, 18–20, cit. in Wackernagel 1993, 87.
21. Plotinus is considered the first philosopher to think and live this experience of negations 
becoming the only full expression of what lies beyond the capacity of language to say, that is, 
of a language that is fully aware of the reasons for its own impossibility: “la parole négative est 
à la fois un mode de langage et un mode de vie… nous pouvons distinguer ces deux aspects en 
usant de la différence entre deux mots dont l’un, apophasis, ren voie à la langue, c’est-à-dire à sa 
grammaire, tandis que l’autre, aphairesis, signifie chez Plotin qu’une opération de détachement 
est opérée du soi sur soi-même: la négation est alors une manière de jeter-dehors loin de soi, elle 
est une forme de purification, en tant qu’elle est aussi une œuvre de pensée” (Charles-Saget 
2013, 394). As Porter has pointed out, however, already in Plato we see an effort to reach beyond 
the senses and the sensible that is less a theory of representation than a theory of the unrepre-
sentable, of that which lies beyond representability, imagery, sensation, and even the imagin-
able—what may better be conceived as a theory of the sublime (Porter 2010, 76). It is worth 
noting that it speaks of in terms of theory, not of experience.
22. De Libera 2014, 2.
23. Assmann 2009, 13. 
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from making images. On the other hand, it has to do with the theologi-
cal question of God’s nature in the sense that, given God’s invisibility and 
transcendence of this world, images were considered the wrong medium to 
establish a contact with the divine, resulting in a radical turn of language 
towards a negative theology. 
Where images are put in the service of worship, belief in images brings 
God down to earth, to dwell among people and open a path to commu-
nication. For aniconists, however, images are seen to idolize the world 
instead and distract from the creator. Idolatry means entanglement with 
the world, addiction to the visible and the material, where God cannot 
be worshiped. In this vein, Eckhart asks “How indeed can one make a vis-
ible likeness of the infinite, of the immense, the invisible, or the form of an 
uncreated image?”24
In the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the Word became visible, Christianity 
found reason to reintroduce imagery of both the visible and the invisible 
world. Nevertheless, Eckhart remained critical of images in order to fix on 
their essence and how it is experienced. God and creatures are not alike and 
yet, he insists, they are like each other. Obviously, the creator differs from 
the created, but there must be some similarity insofar as the image cannot be 
separated from its model any more than art can be separated from the art-
ist. Similarity and dissimilarity collide as two contradictory points of view 
collide but cannot be disentangled. As Wackernagel explains, they belong 
to the very ethos of the image as a lived mystical experience or a “spiritual 
exercise” of the meditative sort in which the intellect has no choice but to 
ascend to a direct intuition of transcendence.25 
Transcendence here does not mean rejecting the world. The loss and 
disimagining (entbilden) of the world amounts to “settling in” the being 
through which the world exists. Although the status of the world is that of 
a “pure nothingness,” it cannot help being a divine creation. Eckhart speaks 
of the nobility of being and of the divine being as the light of all creation, 
but his metaphors have to be read as part of a broader aphairetic method 
which consists in the passage from earthly reality to divine nothingness by 
following the path of Entbildung. That path leads from “dusk to dawn,” that 
24. Cited in Wackernagel 1993, 81.
25. Ibid., 85.
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is, from the alienated soul to the depths of the soul—without any distinc-
tion, devoid of all imagery (aller bilde entibildet), full of nothingness. 
Eckhart’s doctrine of the image can therefore be considered a conceptual 
reformulation of aphairesis and apophasis, that is to say, abstraction and neg-
ative theology. It has to do with the model (Urbild) whose copy (Abbild) 
is the image, which can be translated then into ontological terms: model-
image, divine and created being, esse (being), and ens (that which is because 
of being). The image shares the same essence and resembles its model from 
the moment that it “is.” The image-being participates in the being of the 
model. Entbildung, as the “negation of the negation” of all images, proves to 
be a highly positive negation of the image. In the very act of speaking of the 
nothingness of the image, we are led directly to an acknowledgment of the 
plenitude of being in the model or archetype, or of the ungraspable reality 
through which such archetypes exist. It is only then that the being of the 
image, in the mode of being-this-or-that, can be established.
The paradox of representation
When Nishitani refers to Eckhart in Religion and Nothingness, he empha-
sizes the pure nihilum of the creature and the nothingness of God and the 
personal relationship between God and human beings as a living relation-
ship between the “image of God” in the soul and its “original image.” His 
standpoint here lies beyond theism and atheism: 
Eckhart names the “essence” of God that is free of all form—the completely 
“image-free” (bildlos) godhead—as “nothingness,” and considers the soul to 
return to itself and acquire absolute freedom only when it becomes totally 
one with the “nothingness” of the godhead…. In the case of Eckhart, the 
“nothingness” in which God’s ground is my own, and my ground is God’s 
own, is the field that brings about a personal relationship between God and 
man. It is on this field of “nothingness” that the actual Form—the visible 
Form or Bild—of everything that exists, including God, comes to light. Only 
in this “nothingness” is everything that is represented as God or soul, and the 
relationships between them, made possible.26 
Now what I suggest is that Nishitani finds in Eckhart’s ontology of the 
image (or perhaps better, in his ontophany) a standpoint that is in a certain 
26. Nishitani 1982, 99.
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sense analogous to the field of emptiness which aims to overcome the para-
dox of representation. Consider the following passage from the same work:
As the saying goes, “A bird flies and it is like a bird. A fish swims and it looks 
like a fish.” The selfness of the flying bird in flight consists of its being like a 
bird; the selfness of the fish as it swims consists of looking like a fish. Or put 
the other way around, the “likeness” of the flying bird and the swimming fish 
is nothing other than their true “suchness.”… 
On this field of emptiness, modern man’s standpoint of subjective self-
consciousness, which had been opened up by Kant’s Copernican Revolution, 
has to be revolutionized once again.27
In this passage, Nishitani identifies the “likeness” of how a being appears 
with the “suchness” of how it is. He claims that the two coincide in a field 
that goes beyond the standpoint of subjective self-consciousness that has 
become the hallmark of modernity after Kant. Why? 
Nishitani begins his book by asking what religion is and, in particular, 
where it comes from. In defining religion as a real realization of reality 
itself, he is led to ask what is real. In a footnote he explains that he uses the 
terms real and reality in a broader sense than merely to denote something 
actually in existence. Adopting them to refer to nihility is difficult, because 
nihility, as the absolute negation of existence as real, occasionally becomes 
really present, as when we find ourselves saying, “It all came to nothing.” 
Therefore all real beings are reality, but not everything that is real is neces-
sarily a real being. 
As his argument advances, Nishitani claims that the standpoint of emp-
tiness makes it possible to enter into real contact with the reality of things, 
that is, with things in themselves. His wording suggests an association with 
the Kantian Ding an sich or noumenon. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant had argued that it is impossible to have knowledge of a thing as it is 
in itself by means of concepts or intuitions. Nishitani does not reject this 
view but proposes to experience things in themselves by nonsubjective, 
nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual means—what he calls a “knowing 
of non-knowing.”28 
27. Ibid., 139.
28. For Gregory Moss this is a kind of faith in the sense of a trust that something is true in a 
way that transcends demonstration and lies beyond both reason and subjectivity: “it is not only 
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According to Nishitani, the problem with the standpoint of modern sub-
jectivity is that it assumes that “something lies outside subjectivity,” which 
of itself amounts to an act of subjectivity in which things are represented as 
having an existence independent of their representation. However, insofar 
as subject and object are correlative terms, it is not possible to posit a thing 
as independent of subjectivity. The subject is always the subject of an object, 
and the object is always the object for a subject:
On the field of consciousness things are all “received” as objective entities by 
the self-conscious ego posited as a subjective entity. Things are set in opposi-
tion to consciousness as “external” actualities. This is so… because the very 
possibility of things being viewed externally already implies the field of con-
sciousness. Even to say of something merely that it lies outside of subjectivity 
is still an act of subjectivity. An object is nothing other than something that 
has been represented as an object, and even the very idea of something inde-
pendent of representation can only come about as a representation. This is 
the paradox essential to representation (and hence to the “object” as well), an 
aporia inherent in the field of consciousness itself.29
Nishitani observes that throughout the history of Western philosophy 
the idea of “beings” and “existence” have been thought of either in terms of 
“substance” or of “subject.” Every entity is thought to exist in itself, to be on 
its own ground. The concept of substance refers to that which makes a thing 
what it is, that gives it a self-identity that survives the incessant changes 
that occur in its various “accidental” properties. To be is to be a substance, 
because, from the very outset, beings are considered objects. This is the case 
because beings set before the subject representationally are perceived from 
the subject’s point of view. Nishitani claims that it is here that the paradox of 
representation comes into play. 
the thing in itself that can be known only by transcending reason, but subjectivity itself is also 
not knowable in any other way” (Moss 2019, 280). As Moss explains, this is a noncognitive 
knowing because, unlike Kantian knowing, it transcends the cognizing subject. The thing in 
itself is nonobjective because it transcends the field of consciousness in which the thing is given 
as an object of consciousness. It is a docta ignorantia, an immediate experience of the thing in 
itself, but it is not an intuition in that it breaks through consciousness and cannot be consti-
tuted by any relationality like intuition that takes place on the field of consciousness: “Rather 
than return to dogmatic metaphysics, Nishitani transcends metaphysics altogether” (Ibid., 279). 
29. Nishitani 1982, 122.
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With his cogito, Descartes gave preference to the same sub-iectum30 that 
Kant subscribed to, but he held that the object must conform to the consti-
tution of subjectivity and its self-consciousness.31 Kant, for his part, showed 
that the activity and constitution of self-consciousness determines the con-
stitution of the object of consciousness, that self-consciousness is simulta-
neously the consciousness of an object. Since all conceptual determinations 
of an object are subjective representations, subjectivity can only know what 
is for us or what is phenomenal; it is consequently excluded from knowing 
things in themselves. Thus, all objects are representations. They are “appear-
ances,” whose mode of being is defined through our perception of how they 
appear. Nishitani’s point is that whereas Kant marked a milestone in the 
awareness of such a subject, he was not able to solve the paradox of repre-
sentation.32
The problem with the standpoint of modern subjectivism is that it 
implies that we cannot enter into real contact with the reality of things. As 
we may deduce from Heidegger’s “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), we 
30. Cf. Heidegger 2002, 66. “It is in the metaphysics of Descartes that, for the first time, 
the being is defined as the objectness of representation, and truth as the certainty of represen-
tation.” As a result, the “objectification of beings is accomplished in a setting-before, a repre-
senting [Vor-stellen], aimed at bringing each being before it in such a way that the man who 
calculates can be sure—and that means certain—of the being. Science as research first arrives 
when, and only when, truth has transformed itself into the certainty of representation” (ibid.). 
And the reason for that lies according to him in that “The preference given to a sub-iectum (that 
which lies at the basis as ground) which is preeminent in that it is, in an essential respect, un-
conditioned, stems from man’s demand for a fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis; 
for an unshakable ground of truth, in the sense of certainty, which rests in itself ” (ibid.). 
31. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 111: “Kant interpreted substance as one of the a priori concepts of 
pure reason, as something that thought ‘thinks into’ (hineindenkt) objects…. The mode of being 
which is said to have rid itself of its relationship to the subjective has simply been constituted 
through a covert inclusion of a relationship to the subjective, and so cannot, after all, escape the 
charge of constituting a mode of being defined through its appearance to us.”
32. As Moss observes, Kant cannot help overstepping the limits he has imposed on reason 
itself. Subjectivity as it is can only appear as a paradox from the perspective of reason, as other 
philosophers before Nishitani, like Fichte, Hegel, and Husserl, had noted: “In these various ap-
proaches, subjectivity and reason are re-conceived in order to maintain a philosophical way out 
of the problem. What distinguishes Nishitani’s approach is (i) his attempt to transcend phi-
losophy and the field of subjectivity altogether by (ii) showing how the lack of self-reference 
inherent in categories and things leads to (iii) absolute nothingness as the ground of subjectivity” 
(Moss 2019, 281).
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are fixed in a kind of anthropocentrism. Modern representatio (Vor-stellen) is 
quite distinct from the Greek notion of apprehension. It means to bring the 
present-at-hand before us as something that stands over-and-against us, to 
relate it to ourselves as representers and thus force it into the domain of the 
subject and its norms. When this happens one “puts oneself in the picture” 
with regard to beings.33 For Heidegger, the process of people becoming sub-
jects is interwoven with the process of the world becoming a picture:
The process, namely, whereby the more completely and comprehensively the 
world, as conquered, stands at man’s disposal, and the more objectively the 
object appears, all the more subjectively (i.e., peremptorily) does the sub-
iectum rise up, and all the more inexorably too, do observations and teach-
ings about the world transform themselves into a doctrine of man, into an 
anthropology [that is, that philosophical interpretation of the human that 
explains and evaluates beings as a whole from the standpoint of, and in rela-
tion to, human beings].34 
It is worth remarking that Heidegger published this essay when Nishitani 
was enrolled in Heidegger’s course on Nietzsche (from 1937 to 1939). Hei-
degger’s philosophy exerted a significant influence on him, as evidenced in 
the echoes of the aforementioned text in Nishitani’s own writings.
33. Heidegger 2002, 69. Regarding the contrast between the ancient Greek and mod-
ern philosophers: “The modem interpretation of beings is still further removed from that of 
the Greeks.… The being is that which rises up and opens itself; that which, as what is present, 
comes upon man, i.e., upon him who opens himself to what is present in that he apprehends it. 
The being does not acquire being in that man first looks upon it in the sense of representation 
that has the character of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by 
beings, the one who is gathered by self opening beings into presencing with them. To be looked 
at by beings, to be included and maintained and so supported by their openness, to be driven 
about by their conflict and marked by their dividedness, that is the essence of humanity in the 
great age of Greece. In order to fulfill his essence, therefore, man has to gather (legein) and save 
(sotein), catch up and preserve, the self-opening in its openness; and he must remain exposed 
to all of its divisive confusion” (Heidegger 2002, 68). Unlike this openness and exposure 
to beings, modern “Man becomes the representative [Repräsentant] of beings in the sense of 
objective.” Human beings take up a position in the midst of beings as those who have consti-
tuted themselves and secures that position in place as the basis for a possible development of 
humanity: “What begins is that the mode of human being which occupies the realm of human 
capacity as the domain of measuring and execution for the purpose of mastery of beings as a 
whole” (ibid., 69). 
34. Heidegger 2002, 70.
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For Nishitani, this standpoint of modern subjectivity reached a crisis 
point with the emergence of nihilism. Since Kant’s time, and especially in 
existentialism, the process of awakening to subjectivity advanced until it 
arrived at the notion of an “ecstatic existence” within nihility, which marked 
a step further away from the paradox of representation. Within the field of 
nihility, things cease to be “objects” and, as a result, appear as realities cut off 
from representation. The subject comes to exist in such a way that its very 
“existence” is manifest in nihility35 and “existence” itself becomes a single 
great question mark.36 According to Nishitani, since absolute nothingness 
lies at the basis of subjectivity, it is within the field of nihility that the subject 
becomes more originally subjective and, at the same time, that everything 
appears more in accord with its suchness. But the standpoint of emptiness 
is much more than the standpoint of consciousness (on which the opposi-
tion between materialism and idealism is constituted), self-consciousness, 
and nihility. Nishitani speaks of a more elemental field, the field of emp-
tiness, where things are not simply the subjective representations idealism 
takes them for. Nor are they merely the objective entities or external actu-
alities independent of consciousness posited by realism and materialism.37 
35. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 111: “That nihility opens up at the ground of a being means that the 
field of that being’s ‘existence,’ of its essential mode of being, opens up. In nihility both things 
and the subject return to their respective essential modes of being, to their very own home-
ground where they are what they originally are.”
36. See Nishitani 1982, 108: “When the field of consciousness is broken through, allow-
ing nihility to open forth at its ground, and when things are ‘nullified’ and become unreal or 
deactualized, subjective existence takes this nihility as a field of ek-stasis and reverts nearer to 
an original subjectivity. So, too, when we say that things are deactualized or made unreal, we do 
not mean that they are transformed into mere illusory appearances. We mean that, deprived of 
the character of external actuality, things also escape the subjectivism, the representationalism 
that lurks behind so-called external actualities. As we understand it here, being cut off from 
representation is diametrically opposed to subsisting as an objective being apart from represen-
tation…. On the field of consciousness, the very idea of an external actuality independent of rep-
resentation only arises as a representation. Conversely, on the field of nihility, when things cease 
to be external actualities or objects, they escape representation and appear in their own reality. 
When the field of nihility opens up simultaneously at the ground of both subject and object, 
when it appears behind the relationship of subject and object, it always presents itself as a field 
that has been there from the first at the ground of that relationship. What seems to make things 
and ourselves unreal in fact makes them emerge more really. In Heidegger’s terms, the being of 
beings discloses itself in the nullifying of nothingness (das Nicht nichtet).”
37. Nishitani 1982, 109–10: “However independent things may be of consciousness they 
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It is here that the aforementioned “knowing of non-knowing” takes place as 
an apprehension of things themselves, as they are manifest and before they 
have been grasped by sensation or by reason. 
In emptiness, a thing is neither a phenomenon that appears to us nor is it 
something noumenal that is unknowable for us. Its likeness (the flying of a 
bird that looks like a bird) is the mode of being of a thing as it is in itself. To 
explain this, Nishitani argues that the thing actually exists in its own “home-
ground” (moto もと) or “middle position” (chū 中).38 Furthermore, the self is 
radically itself in self-identity with everything. This mode of being of things 
in themselves cut off from the sort of mode of being reflected in the subject-
object frame of reference, cannot be substantial, much less subjective. Nei-
ther can the mode of being of the self under those circumstances be said to 
be subjective or substantial. The opposition between subject and object is 
gone, and with it, the paradox of representation.39 
cannot be independent of nihility. Sooner or later all things return to nihility. Things cannot 
be actual without being deactualized; things cannot really exist except as unreal. Indeed it is 
in their very unreality that things are originally real. Moreover, in nihility the existence of ex-
isting things is able to be revealed, questioned , and perceived. The existence of things is seen 
to be at one with the existence of the subject itself by the subject that has become its original 
subjectivity. This is why we say that nothing whatsoever can exist independently of nihility….” 
“Neither the field of consciousness nor the field of nihility can come about apart from the field 
of emptiness. Prior to the appearance that things take on the field of consciousness, where they 
are objectivized as external realities, and prior to the more original appearance things assume 
on the field of nihility, where they are nullified, all things are on the field of emptiness in their 
truly elemental and original appearances. In emptiness things come to rest on their own home-
ground. At the same time, prior to the consciousness of objects which has representation as its 
cornerstone, and prior to coming to know of existence in nihility.”
38. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 131: “The thing itself goes on positing itself as it is; it goes on being 
in its own ‘middle,’ a shape without shape, a form of non-form…. Looked at from the circumfer-
ence, then, the various shapes of a thing do not fit the thing itself. But looking back from the 
selfness of the thing—that is, from its center-its ‘middle’ mode of being pervades all shapes. In 
a word, all sensory modes and all supersensory eidetic forms of a thing are not to be seen apart 
from the ‘position’ (the self-positing mode of being) of the thing. They are all appearances of the 
thing itself, which remains through it all in the mode of being of a shape without shape, a form 
of non-form, in its ‘middle’ mode of being.”
39. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 120: “In general, no matter how much we think of an objectivity 
within things and events lying beyond our consciousness and its representations, so long as they 
are envisaged as things and events in the ordinary sense of those words- that is, so long as they 
are looked upon objectively as objects their objective reality has yet to elude the contradiction of 
being represented as something lying beyond representation.”
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This mode of being of a thing being itself and at the same time being self-
identical with everything else reminds us of the aforementioned non-dualist 
standpoint of Huayan Buddhism. Here, as elsewhere, Nishitani’s criticism 
of Western metaphysics clearly draws on Buddhist ideas. In fact, one of his 
concerns in Religion and Nothingness is the one-dimensional relationship 
of correspondence that Western epistemology has traditionally devised to 
relate “thing” to “concept.” His criticism is similar to what Heidegger points 
out when discussing truth as aletheia or self-disclosure rather than corre-
spondence or adequatio. 
The free play between disimagination  
and sentiment: how express reality? 
The universe is an image 
that reproduces itself continuously.
Plotinus, Enneads 2.3 [52].18.16–17
The formless form
We now come to the question of whether Nishitani’s standpoint on emp-
tiness can be understood as a sort of disimagination, a spiritual process of 
abstraction and a via negativa. On the one hand, Nishitani’s use of paradox 
and negative language is too obvious to ignore. We see it, for instance, in the 
expression “Form of non-Form” (無相の相),40 which resonates with Nishi-
da’s claim that seeing the “form of the formless” and hearing the sound of the 
soundless lie at the roots of Eastern culture.41 On the other hand, Nishitani’s 
reflections on imagination and its expression through religion, art, and 
poetry refer to a kind of practice that come close to what Eckhart meant by 
Entbildung. The matter merits a closer look.
The awareness of our contingency—in Buddhist terms, the imperma-
nence of all forms of existence—is described by Nishitani as the nothing-
40. This expression has to be distinguished from that of “form of non-form” (無形相の形相). 
Van Bragt employed the upper case to distinguish this Buddhist term from the ordinary and 
philosophical meanings of “form,” for example, as in eidos (形相), visible form or image (見相), 
and Kant’s forms of intuition (形式). 
41. nkz 4: 6 (『働くものから見るものへ』, 1927).
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ness that comes to us in “limit-situations”42 that bring us face to face with 
the meaninglessness of our existence:
A person comes to be nothing more than “an appearance with nothing at all 
behind it to make an appearance. Person is constituted at one with absolute 
nothingness as that in which absolute nothingness becomes manifest. It is 
actualized as a “Form of non-Form.”43 
In his essay “On Bashō,” Nishitani argues that this is a universal experi-
ence, but that Eastern and Western traditions differ in their interpretations 
of it. Greek philosophy and Christianity think in terms of an eternal, immu-
table, and incorruptible being situated deep within impermanence that 
transcends them. On the philosophical level, this being behind the being of 
impermanent things is posited as the basis for change; on the religious level, 
it offers salvation from this changing world. In the East there is no such place 
for seeing an absolute being in the background or looking to it for support. 
Eastern philosophies, mainly Buddhist, “go deeper and deeper through 
what has no bottom”44 until they reach the fullness of impermanence. This is 
how the religious-aesthetic feeling of “the pathos of things” (mono no aware) 
emerged: when one grasps and welcomes something impermanent, just as 
it is in its impermanence, the profound sadness and emotion one feels is 
accompanied by a feeling of affection.45 
The pursuit of this feeling, according to Nishitani, leads to the empti-
ness of Mahayana Buddhism and the poetry of Bashō (1644–1694). In both 
cases, we are dealing with a practice that consists in pushing the understand-
ing of impermanent things such as they are to an extreme at which vanity or 
nihility are overcome. He speaks of it as a “heading towards death” through 
“abandoning one’s own self ” and “death to one’s own self.” Through this 
process, a moment of “inversion” of nihility is established. In the moment 
at which impermanence is radicalized, a conversion takes place. To borrow 
a Mahayana Buddhist phrase, the understanding that “forms are just emp-
42. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 26: “a kind of formal aspect of reality, then let it not be as a form 
distinct from content, but rather as the ‘form of non-form’ for the whole content-and-form that 
is said to be corrupted as such.” 
43. Nishitani 1982, 71. 
44. Nishitani 2001b, 135–6.
45. Ibid., 140.
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tiness” (great wisdom) is reversed in the understanding that “emptiness is 
precisely the forms” (great compassion).46 It is there that impermanence is 
radicalized into emptiness by means of death.47 The world of images, as Hase 
puts it, becomes more real than reality.48 
“Emptiness” is the real form of reality. Real Form as such is a “non-Form.” 
Only in its non-Form does a fact become manifest as a fact.… The real Form 
of all things, including man, comes to be a “double exposure” of life and 
death. All living things can be seen under the Form of death without thereby 
being separated from their proper Form of life. The real appearance of these 
things must be seen at ground to rest on the basis of absolute being-sive-
nothingness, nothingness-sive-being, or of the absolute non-duality of life 
and death.49 
46. The allusion is to the famous phrase from the Heart Sutra: “Form is emptiness, emptiness 
is form” (色即是空、空即是色), where “form” means thing or phenomenon. 
47. Cf. Nishitani 1999, 182–3: “What we could call the negativity of the word has pro-
gressed in its thoroughness until it has turned into the meditative practice of contemplation 
of the void and has reached the point of expressing a positive meaning as the fundamental self-
consciouness of Buddhism.” He adds that this is also the case with poets.
48. Hase 1997, 67.
49. Nishitani 1982, 76. Cf. “The ‘what’ of a thing is a real ‘what’ only when it is absolutely 
no ‘what’ at all . The eidetic form of a thing is truly form only when it is one with absolute non-
form. For example, the form ‘human being’ of ‘this is a human being’ emerges at the point that 
the form has cut itself off from all such form. Within every human being a field of absolute 
non-form opens up as a point indeterminable as ‘human being’ or some other ‘what.’ To say that 
man becomes manifest as man from such a point is nothing other than the original meaning of 
the claim that he exists as a man” (Nishitani 1982, 125).
And: “If, for example, from the standpoint of reason, one conceives of the being of a thing 
in itself as a substance and explains what it is substantially, one does not thereby find the thing 
itself but only an eidetic form ‘comparable’ to the thing itself. In even trying to ordain it as 
one thing or another by means of thought, one has already missed the thing itself.… On that 
field of śūnyatā each thing becomes manifest in its suchness in its very act of affirming itself, 
according to its own particular potential and virtus and in its own particular shape. For us as 
human beings, to revert to that field entails at one and the same time an elemental affirmation 
of the existence of all things (the world) and an elemental affirmation of our own existence. The 
field of śūnyatā is nothing other than the field of the Great Affirmation…. Parallel to talk of 
substance with regard to things goes talk of the subject, which is the particular regard of human 
existence” (Nishitani 1982, 131). 
And finally: “Thus, although the elemental source of being that has thus become one with 
nothingness, of self-centeredness so constituted at one with nihility, lies directly under human 
existence, it is there that the form of human existence is cast away. Since nihility is absolutely 
non-form, that is, since it represents the point at which all form returns to nothingness, being—
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In Nishitani’s terms, being at that elemental source of union with noth-
ingness is to be rid of all form and exist simply as a sheer being-in-the-world. 
In formlessness, reality is at hand to one just as it is. We recall that for 
Nishitani we only get in touch with the reality of things through action or 
praxis undertaken beyond the standpoint of representation. On what kind 
of field is such praxis possible? Because the self that practices there is a “self 
that is not a self,” we cannot be talking about something that “the self does.”50 
Here again, paradox is the only way to express action that both is the self ’s 
doing and at the same time is not the self ’s doing: an “action of non-action,” 
that free and unconditioned “non-doing” that “people in the past” referred 
to. (Nishitani seems to be thinking of Daoist thinkers and their notion of 
wuwei 無為 or non-action.) 
In Religion and Nothingness, this non-doing is understood in religious 
terms as observance of “the samādhi of self-enjoyment, an absolute freedom 
of harmony or order,” but it is also applied to engagement with haiku, waka, 
renga, and the tea ceremony as “a way to go” or a “practice.”51 The rationale is 
the same: when reflective thought intervenes, when preoccupation with fash-
ion and other forms of objective representation come on the scene, “Form” is 
set up as something outside of the self.52 To view observance or practice as rep-
resentative implies a subject attached to an objective Form. On the contrary, 
the man moving his limbs, the clouds floating across the sky, the water flow-
ing, the leaves falling, and the blossoms scattering are all non-Form. Their 
Form is a Form of non-Form. To adopt this Form of non-Form as the Form 
of the self is precisely what is meant by the standpoint of observance.53
at that elemental source where it is in unison with nothingness—is a being that has rid itself of 
all form.… It is a sheer being-in-the-world as such” (Nishitani 1982, 248).
50. Cf. Nishitani 1982, 277: “As it is not merely ‘the self,’ so it is not merely a ‘doing.’ Which 
is to say, it is not simply something that originates spontaneously from within the self as subject 
by freedom of the will. This does not mean that it must necessarily originate from without the 
self, for instance from a material relation of some sort or other. What arises of necessity cannot 
properly be described as behavior of the self, or as something done by the self. In their usual 
senses, neither the standpoint of freedom nor the standpoint of necessity grasps behavior in its 
reality.”
51. 行 (iku, gyō) can mean both, to go and to practice. On practice, see Nishitani 2001a.
52. Nishitani recalls here the Zhuangzi parable of the Chaos as told by Zen master Hakuin 
(Nishitani 1982, 199–200).
53. Ibid., 200. “In the Existenz of the dropped off body-and-mind, all prajña and time must 
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 There are two remarkable points in this passage. First, Nishitani speaks 
in terms of movements and verbs, not of substances and nouns. Second, he 
avoids anthropocentrism in likening the way of being of human beings to 
the receptive disposition of the flow of nature, to an attitude of “letting go” 
or release.54 Nishitani draws our attention to a profound sense of reality 
within impermanence itself, since it is there that things as they truly are can 
be known. 
Moreover, it is imagery—like that embodied in Bashō’s poetry—that 
guides us on the path to concrete things. In fact, without a perspective to 
open up the closures of our everyday way of seeing something as simple as a 
flower, there can be no poetry: 
We watch as we pass by a normal nazuna flower. However, while looking at 
ourselves we don’t really look. Or, to use the word “encounter,” we are not 
encountering the flower. What does it mean to meet the nazuna flower? 
When “a nazuna flower blooms” it means that the plant is throwing out the 
petals. It is a simple event, but in Bashō’s case, this flower—which, needless 
to say, is so small that it goes unnoticed—shines in that moment with a kind 
of beauty. As it were, as a flower that shines, it should strike attention. In a 
sense, such a small flower is not inferior to beautiful flowers such as lilies or 
be a non-Form . They are the Form of non-Form of that Existenz. In the foregoing, I dealt with 
birth-and-death on the field of samsāra-sive-nirvāna as the problem of time in the Existenz of 
the dropped off body-and-mind (that is, of true emptiness). This Existenz is a standpoint of ab-
solute freedom. By means of its own dharma, this Existenz maintains dhāranī over all phenom-
ena in their dharma-like nature, or suchness, within this world of transitoriness and uses them 
for its own enjoyment. Hence, when the self as body-and-mind is born, it is a birth that is an 
unbirth; and when it passes away, it is a passing away that is a non-passing away” (Nishitani 
1982, 200). 
“This could be called the self-centeredness of the formless self, or the self of non-ego that has 
cast off all so-called self-centeredness. The observance (and its Dasein) that sustains the ‘flesh 
and blood’ of that self of non-Form, while realizing such a Way and such a field, is none other 
than the revelation of the Right Path for all others to follow back to their own home-grounds, 
by killing all others and thereby killing themselves. This relationship of circuminsessional 
interpenetration harbors an elemental strife in the sense that Heraclitus speaks of strife as fa-
ther of all. For each thing to be an absolute center portends a strife above all strife. Yet insofar 
as this comes about only on the field of emptiness and non-ego, this strife is at once an absolute 
harmony and an elemental peace” (Nishitani 1982, 263–4; italics added) .
54. Interestingly, the expression of detachment implied in the “aphairesis” in Plotinus also 
relies on verbs (and movements) while nouns are not privileged, and includes a sort of “laisser-
être” (See Charles-Saget 1990: 338–9).
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roses, rather it shines as if it were a precious stone, of a beauty that we do not 
know but is present. She shines, urging Bashō, and makes herself present to 
his spirit. When one looks at beauty in the flower of nazuna, it is not beauty 
in the normal sense of the word. This means that the flower of nazuna, break-
ing further into a place where it cannot be called beautiful in the normal 
sense of beauty of the lily and rose, manifests itself invested with the light of 
poetry. Here, if Bashō had not overcome the prospect of normal aesthetic 
judgments—such as “the rose is beautiful and the nazuna is not”—and had 
not overcome the perspective of normal consciousness and self-awareness, 
this beauty of the nazuna flower would not have manifested itself.55
Here there is no reflection, no representation. One is simply caught up 
in things or struck by things. The standpoint of the “I” is broken and the 
way is open to a standpoint of emptiness in which things manifest them-
selves before our eyes in their true way of being. To express authentic see-
ing, Nishitani uses the time-worn image of two mirrors directly facing each 
other with no reflected image. In the case of the nazuna flower, it is not that 
we are actually looking at it; rather, we are being looked at by it without 
noticing what is happening. The reason, Nishitani explains, is that nature 
or infinite life resides within the nazuna flower, and this is what Bashō calls 
“creation.” 
In a word, in becoming an image, a thing appears to us in its reality. 
Correspondingly, as we will see next, the image becomes emptiness when 
reflected in our sentiments.
Emptiness within the sensory world
In his essay “Emptiness and Sameness” (「空と即」), Nishitani writes that 
there is a much more of a direct relationship between the visible phenome-
non and the invisible thing indicated by words like “emptiness/sky” (空) and 
“empty sky” (虚空) than merely a metaphorical link. There is an intimacy that 
exceeds logic. He uses the German word Bild, “image,” to name such words 
and immediately adds that it is not a figure or image in a strict sense but a 
visible image without form. Though formless, that which lies beyond words 
and understanding, like emptiness, regulates the sensations, perceptions, 
emotions, and moods occurring in everyday life—a sensory and emotional 
55. Nishitani 2001b, 156, 159.
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emptiness.56 Poetry and religion penetrate the source of experience while 
philosophy departs from experience, objectifying cognition, and offering an 
understanding of that reality that is grasped through direct bodily experience. 
Nishitani recognizes that the awareness of things difficult to express in 
words may eventually lead to silent meditation and silent envisioning. But 
as in the via negativa, “this condition is the appearance of the limits binding 
the possibility of linguistic arts, as well as the fact that the impossibility of 
art becomes a possibility.” 57 This, he tells us, is where the horizon of religion 
appears: “The appearance of reality as simply ‘reality’, beyond language and 
its logos and reason, is the end of the way known as art and the beginning of 
the new way of religion.”58 Now even if art and religion differ on this point, 
it is the boundary that makes mutual penetration possible. 
At this point, Nishitani turns to the problem of the image in art and 
religion, which he treats as a question of essence and phenomenon, that 
can only be solved from a viewpoint where divergence and connection, 
discrimination and non-discrimination, are maintained at the same time. 
He quotes Eckhart’s notion of hineinbilden (making an image as thinking 
inwardly) and refers to the notions of imago Dei and the Buddha nature. 
The viewpoint he advocates is one of unhinderedness in which the world 
is opened up as one and all relations come into being. It is, we might say, 
an opening of relativity in which the walls of individuality that close us off 
from the world become transparent59 and the being enters into a revolv-
ing, reciprocal relation. In other words, “within ‘reality’, the image that has 
become one with reality appears as the distinctive form of the image itself.”60 
There is no contradiction between the hollow space of openness, where not 
one thing exists, and actuality, where all sorts of things exist.61 Imagination 
56. Nishitani 1999, 185. 
57. Nishitani 1999, 196.
58. Ibid. In this essay Nishitani makes a clearer distinction between art and religion, unlike 
the essay cited previously in which he considers Bashō’s way of haiku as both an artistic and an 
ascetical-religious path (see note 55 above).
59. Nishitani 1999, 203, refers to being “making being transparent” (有の透明化). This no-
tion is central to later Nishitani’s theory of image (Hase 2009, 78). On this question, see also 
Hosoya 2008.
60. See Nishitani 1999, 203.
61. Of interest to our argument here is the fact that Nishitani refers explicitly to Huayan 
Buddhism.
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brings this about by opening up the mediating zone where senses and intel-
lect combine in an unbreakable link.62 Moreover, imagination is where art, 
mythology, revelation, mysticism, enlightenment, and so on are given, expe-
rienced, and communicated: “The creation of the artist and the faith of the 
religious person can be conveyed from heart to heart, thanks to the work of 
imagination.”63 
In the case of poetry—“rooted in the deepest foundation of the form of 
existence known as man, for it is the self-expression of man”64—and particu-
larly in haikai, techniques have been developed to bring about nonobjective 
and nonrepresentational ways of expressing such a reality. Nishitani notes 
the reverberation of words effected by the caesurae between the five- and 
seven-syllable phrases. These cuts deepen the links by creating a discontinu-
ous continuity or, in the aesthetic category Ōhashi Ryōsuke has suggested, 
in order to express the characteristically Japanese sense of art and natural 
beauty, a kire-tsuzuki (切れ‐つづき).65 Nishitani further mentions the gram-
matical particles in Japanese as powerful expressions of the spoken and the 
mute, of the reciprocal permeation of words and silence. Here, however, I 
would like to turn to a rhetorical strategy employed by Zen master Dōgen 
(1200–1253) to illuminate what I think Nishitani has in mind.
Dōgen’s deconstructive “mitate”
As Aldo Tollini explains, mitate (見立て) means “to suggest” or “to infer” an 
absent element b by means of an element a that is present in the text. The 
purpose of the device is to recall something in absentia by drawing atten-
tion to something in presentia, thus allowing something concealed within 
the text to be inferred through the use of words. The intuition of the hidden 
meaning of mitate depends, of course, on the attention and sensitivities of 
the reader. Let us consider an example.
After commenting on a poem by the Chinese master Wanshi (1091–1157), 
Dōgen appends the following verses:
62. Cf. “If to see intellectually is represented by the word ‘to reflect’, the image of things is 
always prior to reflection; but at the same time, we can also say that it is prior to reflection” 
(Nishitani 1999, 215).
63. Nishitani 1999, 216.
64. Ibid., 193.
65. Cf. Ōhashi 1986.
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Water is clear to the bottom.
And fish swim just as fish do.
The sky is vast and extends as far as the heaven.
Birds fly just as birds do.66
This is Dōgen’s way of expressing what happens in the awakened mind: 
the unrestrained movements of fish and birds hint at the spontaneous 
movements of those who have reached enlightenment.67 Fish and birds in 
the freedom of their movement are a mitate of nature as a manifestation of 
“original enlightenment.” 
In spite of this, Tollini surmises that Dōgen’s strategy with mitate is 
“deconstructive” on the grounds that there is no separation or opposition 
between what is in praesentia and what is in absentia. Accordingly, Dōgen 
rejects the idea that removing illusion leads to an awakened insight into 
“true reality,” since illusion itself belongs to the truth of reality. Enlighten-
66. 「水清徹地兮 / 魚行似魚 / 空闊透天兮 / 鳥飛如鳥」(cit. in Tollini 2017, 33; grammar 
adjusted here and elsewhere).
67. Tollini (2017, 33) mentions other passages where Dōgen takes up the example of fishes 
and birds to express the state of liberation by means of nature, like the famous one in the 
“Genjōkōan” (現成公案):
Fish swim and in their swimming there are no limits to the water. Birds fly, and in their fly-
ing there is no limits to sky. Things being like that, fish and birds since ancient times do not 
separate from water and sky. When they want to use the big, they use the big, and when they 




Or in the chapter “Only between a buddha and a buddha” (唯仏与仏):
There is a saying from ancient times: “Those who are not fish cannot understand the mind of 
fish. For those who are not birds, it is difficult to follow the tracks of birds.” Very few people 
can understand the meaning of this saying. However, birds know very well the track of their 
fellow birds that in hundreds and thousands in flock have passed by, and the tracks of a cer-
tain number of big birds that went south and have flown to the north. For them these tracks 
are even clearer than the tracks left by the wheels of a cart or the footprint of a horse on the 
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ment and illusion are parts of one and the same reality.68 Mitate is based on 
the conjoining of things that are similar and yet different, like rain and tears. 
This play between comparison and contrast is what gives mitate its character. 
But when tiles become mirrors and flowers in the sky become true reality, 
there is no need any longer for mitate. In this sense, Dōgen may be said to 
use mitate in order to de-construct mitate and, thus, to overturn false views. 
Mitate is based on ordinary logic, whereas the realm of enlightenment lies 
outside the scope of logic; it belongs to the realm of intuition, where tiles 
become mirrors and flowers in the sky are real. In mitate the element in pre-
sentia is a finger pointing to what is in absentia, but for Dōgen, nothing is 
really only a shadow cast by something else; each and every thing, just as it 
is, is real and true.69 
I would argue that Nishitani shares this view, and that it is for this reason 
that he uses the term emptiness to point to the groundless ground that lies 
beneath forms. On the field of emptiness as he understands it, we arrive at a 
standpoint from which to conceive of the workings of reason as it fashions 
its “ideas” and its “ideals” representationally from within itself. It is there, 
too, that we are able to grasp what is at work in the creative power of the art-
ist whose words seem to conjure up the image evoked by the poem.70 From 
the standpoint of emptiness,
the suchness of the bird consists in the fact that “The bird flies and it is like a 
bird.” And the mode of being of we who stand on that field, namely, our self-
ness returned to its own home-ground, comes about at the point where “to 
dwell in the world is to dwell in the void.”… To know things such as they are 
is to restore things to their own home-ground. And if the fact that the bird 
looks like a bird when it is flying points to the fact that the bird is flying, and 
is thus precisely what we called above its primal factuality, then knowing its 
68. Tollini 2017, 39.
69. This makes for a most interesting take on the distinction between the religious catego-
ries of “esoteric” and “exoteric.” As Tollini explains, Dōgen considers “secret language”—and 
anything else that is “secret”—to be nonexistent, or even incapable of existing, by making the 
ingenious claim that “What is called ‘sacred’ is actually ‘familiar,’ ‘intimate.’ It is in-mediate” 
(「いはゆる密は、親密の道理なり。無間断なり」) (Tollini 2017, 41). Instead of pointing to-
wards something lying backstage, this “hidden language” points directly to true reality, mani-
festing elightenment. On this matter, see Kasulis 2018, 264.
70. Here Nishitani mentions the “phantom-like” technique of the poet Bashō (1982, 160).
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suchness is no different from knowing that “this fact is this fact” and “this 
fact has its being as this fact.” The identity of “being” and “knowing” is more 
primal than traditional metaphysics has taken it to be.71 
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by picking up a few ideas related to the 
argument of the preceding pages. I begin with the similarity in the conse-
quences that Nishitani and Nietzsche see for their opposition to traditional 
metaphysics. Eugen Fink captures the point succinctly in his reading of 
Nietzsche when he writes, “The death of God implies a denial of the tra-
ditional distinction between being and appearance.”72 As we have seen, 
Nishitani argues that what appears is an essential part of the essence of 
an emptiness that does not appear. This resultant removal of a substantial 
metaphysical ground acquires a playful, ludic character for him. Not unlike 
Nietzsche’s idea of amor fati73 and Buddhism’s positive take on imperma-
nence, Nishitani identifies the action of time with the nullification of things 
that leads to freedom and novelty: 
Here time and nothingness as the nullification of all things signify the free-
dom and effortless flight of a bird gliding across the sky without a moment’s 
hitch, unburdened. Like the bird that leaves no tracks along the path of 
its flight, impermanence here means the non-hindrance of being free of 
the encumbrances of one’s past and of restrictions stemming from former 
lives. Therefore, just as in the case of the being and time implied in new-
ness, so also in the case of impermanence, and the nothingness and time it 
71. Nishitani 1982, 162–3. Cf. also: “This state of affairs, in which each thing becomes really 
manifest just as it is in its own respective mode of being within a world seen as a circumin-
sessional system where All are One, is, in its original Form, what Buddhism calls ‘thusness’ or 
‘true suchness.’ But the field where this true suchness comes into its own forever opens up only 
in conjunction with the ‘as oneself.’ This is the original form whereby all things become mani-
fest just as they are. To recall an earlier example, this true suchness appears when ‘a bird flies 
and it is like a bird.’ It is at once the very fact of the bird’s flying itself together with a knowledge 
of its suchness. On that same field of emptiness, in the absolute negation of self-love, this ‘like’ 
now becomes also the ‘as’ of the ‘as oneself ’” (Nishitani 1982, 279).
72. Fink 2003, 168.
73. Ibid., 172.
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implies, the meaning of impermanence and nothingness (or nullification) is 
ambiguous.74 
According to Fink, Nietzsche’s view of the ontological dimensions of 
nothing, becoming, appearance, and thinking remain in line with the meta-
physical tradition that he opposes, but when he comes to conceive of being 
and becoming as play, he steps over that line. Human play—notably, the play 
of the child75 and the play of the artist—is transformed into a key concept 
for understanding the universe. Play becomes a cosmic metaphor insofar as 
it discloses the human being’s marvelous ability to grasp illusion as illusion 
and to participate in the play of the cosmos itself by immersing oneself in 
one’s own play. Nishitani, too, conceives of an existence opened ecstatically 
to the world, as something more than simply one thing set apart from other 
things by its capacity for reason. 
Nishitani, for his part, remains within the horizon of an Asian tradition 
of nondualist thinking in distinguishing between the dimension of empti-
ness and form as distinct but not separate polarities of a single process in con-
tinuous flux. In this sense, his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition 
converges with the “postfoundational metaphysics” that has emerged in the 
wake of Heidegger’s critique. In accepting the inescapable contingency of 
existence as a path to liberation from received forms of a rationally grounded 
reality, this philosophical turn to the notion of a “groundless ground” or an 
“abyssal ground” to Being is close to Nishitani’s standpoint of emptiness. 
Secondly, Eckhart’s Entbildung as we discussed it has also been associated 
with deconstructivist thinking and with Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit. 
However, as Wackernagel remarks, Entbildung and deconstruction do not 
refer to the same operation nor do they have the same object. The one deals 
with the spiritual life and represents an activity of an ethical and meditative 
nature; the other designates a process that is alternatively an analytic “dis-
mantling” (which is of concern to the literary critic) and a deconstruction 
of history. Wackernagel acknowledges that deconstruction may have helped 
74. Nishitani 1982, 222.
75. Nishitani uses the image of a child to portray the mode of being of the self that emerges 
into its nature from out of non-ego in a state of “dharmic naturalness,” where work becomes 
play, a serious and earnest play: “For the child is never more earnest than when engaged in 
mindless play” (1982, 255).
bouso: Disimagination and Sentiment in Nishitani | 79
to topple some formidable idols, and in that sense postmodernist thinking 
may be seen as an atheological variant of iconoclasm, but the aim of Ent-
bildung is of a different sort. It does not set out to disassemble structures 
but rather to transcend them in the hopes of understanding them better and 
appropriating them more deeply. And what of Nishitani? My suggestion 
here has been that his self-emptying standpoint of emptiness, as a negation 
of negation, may be seen as a reinterpretation of Entbildung, a transposition 
of the problematic of aphairesis to a new context—that of image, “form,” 
and “formless form.”
Entbildung embodies Eckhart’s attempt to establish the being of images 
on the basis of a “beyond” that grounds them. The first step in the process 
is to drive oneself to the limits of what language can express and to seek 
a metaphorical expression for the invisible. The pursuit of such dynamic 
metaphors cannot be invested with meaning until it has first divested 
itself of meaning. Language here is transformed into a breath of air rest-
ing on “transparency,” as it were. It speaks the nonrepresentable essence of 
all things, a way of thinking and speaking we have also seen in Nishitani. 
This talk of a “beyond” of the image—or in Eckhart’s case, of a beyond that 
grounds the image—should not be taken merely as a reflection on language 
and the limits beyond which it cannot reach. That would be a simple “nega-
tive metaphor.” The gap between the nothingness of the creature and the 
fullness of divine being cannot be bridged simply by transcending the lim-
its of language. In this regard, Wackernagel refers to the various Western 
and Eastern techniques of yoga and meditation as examples of the ethical 
and even practical approaches to Entbildung that are required for abstrac-
tion to become lived experience. The overlaps with Nishitani’s approach 
to praxis and observance as a way for mind to become one with the body 
should be obvious.
As Wackernagel sees it, Entbildung amounts to a way of experiencing a 
certain detachment from the dominant cultural and mental structures of 
the age, but—and this is crucial—without destroying them. In fact, the aim 
of such experience is to protect these structures, to appropriate them and 
live them in all their diversity (something that might prove relevant to inter-
cultural encounters). As relationships of friendship and love relations ben-
efit from non-possessiveness, this spiritual detachment may help improve 
intercultural philosophical encounters. In this regard, what Wackernagel 
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calls “symbiosophy” can serve as a place for such encounters similar to the 
“savage region” mentioned earlier.
Finally, turning to Ueda, we may note his claim that what is important in 
the experience of beauty is the movement of existence which is never reduc-
ible to fixed images, a movement of de-becoming into nothingness without 
leaving a trace behind.76 In Buddhist thought, he observes, beauty is bathed 
in the suchness of things, their participation in an elemental emptiness that 
allows them to freely be, just as they are. Like the renku poets who entered 
into dialogue by writing a new poem, destroying a previous world to create 
a new one and thus establishing a sort of discontinuous continuity, on the 
occasion of his Haas Lectures, Ueda entered into dialogue with Fernando 
Prats’s work, “destroyed” it, and created a new work of his own.77 I should 
mention that the work was exhibited at the 2019 Haas Lectures, to which 
the artist, Fernando Prats, was invited again, this time to create an instal-
lation in homage to and dialogue with the Catalan artist Tàpies. Prats has 
kept Ueda’s work these many years and wished to display it as a remem-
brance of that event (see pages 81f ). I can think of no better way to close 
my remarks than to recall the eloquent image of his footsteps and the ges-
ture of his open arms.
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